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Dr. Nettel proposes an account of the argumentative function of legal principles as topoï,
that is as argumentative items that convey values accepted by a particular legal
community. In her view, legal principles are used to balance or give priority to certain
values in designing legal institutions. In this way they determine the way in which these
institutions are meant to resolve a particular problem. Since in this conception legal
principles are culturally dependent, the solution to a particular legal problem with the aid
of the principles will give rise to different legal solutions in different legal cultures. For
this reason Dr. Nettel argues that the transfer of institutions from one legal culture to
another may be disruptive for the function of a society because each legal culture gives its
own meaning, weight and balance to a particular legal principle and will therefore give
different outcomes.
On the basis of this general account of the argumentative function of general legal
principles, she gives an analysis of the function of the general legal principle of legal
certainty that constitutes the basic principle of the institution of Law and forms the basis
of the institution of Law in modern states governed by the law. This general principle of
legal certainty is based on the need to avoid arbitrary action of governmental power. It
means that coercion should be applied on the basis of existing rules, and in accordance
with an established procedure.
Dr. Nettel explains that this basic idea of legal certainty may lead to different
conceptions of the institution of a procedural system of law, depending on the culture in
which this system of law functions. As an example, she takes the adversary legal
procedure of criminal law as developed in Anglo-American systems and the inquisitorial
legal procedure of criminal law as developed in continental legal systems. She argues that
in the Anglo-American system the principle of certainty is interpreted in such a way that
priority is given to the position of the defendant and his right to self-defence with the
consequence that these individual rights are given priority over the search for truth, thus
resulting in an adversary system of criminal law with a passive judge. In the continental
system the principle of certainty is interpreted in such a way that priority is given to a
search for the truth, thus resulting in an inquisitorial system of criminal law with an
active judge.
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From this explanation of the way in which different conceptions of the principle
of certainty may result in different institutions of a criminal procedure, Dr. Nettel
concludes that the implantation of a particular system of criminal law may give rise to
serious problems, as is demonstrated by the introduction of the adversarial system by
American governments in Latin-American nations. In her view, this forced introduction
has led to a disfunctionality of the administration of justice in countries where insecurity
is at stake.
In my view Dr. Nettel has given a very systematic and interesting theoretical
analysis of the role of general legal principles as culturally dependent values in
interpreting and weighing the way in which legal institutions resolve particular legal
problems. I agree with her theoretical analysis of the argumentative function of legal
principles in general, and the principle of certainty in particular. However I have two
questions regarding some details of the way in which se applies the theoretical analysis to
concrete cases.
1. My first point concerns the analysis of the way in which legal certainty leads to
a preference for a passive judge in an adversary system of criminal law and an active
judge in an inquisitorial system of criminal law. In the analysis of Dr. Nettel I miss an
explanation of the way in which the principle of certainty is used in weighing the choice
for a particular role of the judge in both systems from the perspective of the goal of the
principle: the need to avoid arbitrary action of governmental power by a guarantee of a
procedure according to existing rules. Given the fact that the weighing and balancing on
the basis of the principle leads to different institutions in different cultures it would be
interesting to know which cultural factors influence the preference for a choice for the
different procedures of criminal law. For example, why does the Anglo-Saxon culture
give priority to the individual rights of the defendant and why does the continental culture
give priority to the finding of the material truth?
Furthermore, in her discussion of the continental criminal procedure, it is not
completely clear how the principle of certainty is served by the respect for the
defendant’s right to self-defence, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
remain silent.
In my view the analysis would profit if she could specify how various specific
cultural factors influence these choices.
2. My second point concerns her claim resulting from the conception of legal
principles as culturally determined topoï that the transfer of an institution from one legal
culture to another may be disruptive for the function of society. In her conclusion Dr.
Nettel mentions an example of a situation in which such a transfer of a legal institution,
i.e. the American adversary model imposed on Latin-American nations, has caused big
difficulties. In my view the analysis of the role of the principle of legal certainty would
profit if she could clarify which consequences this transfer has had on the legal culture in
particular countries and in which way a more inquisitorial (or mixed accusatorialinquisitorial) system based on continental law systems of criminal law would have been
more suitable, given the legal culture in these countries.
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